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Internet Policy Project Plan 
At its May 2007 meeting, the London Public Library Board 
voted to adopt the Internet Policy Review Project 
(IPPP). The staff report (which was given to the Board 
at the meeting as an added item) discussed the 
purpose of the project . . . 
Internet Policy Project Plan 
The Report explained the basis of the “problem” the project 
would be addressing. . . 
 
Internet Policy Project Plan 
The Report describes the desired situation . . . 
 
Internet Policy Project Plan 
. . . as well as setting forth the deliverables for the project:. 
 
By the time of the June Board meeting, however, a number of 
questions had been raised by members of the public, including a 
representations from the FIMS community as well as from the 
Chair of the CLA Intellectual Freedom Working Group. 
At the June Board meeting, delegations were heard from Samuel 
Trosow and Roma Harris, and a number of other letters had been 
sent to the Board objecting to the project on various grounds 
including intellectual freedom and access to information concerns. 
Internet Policy Project Plan 
 
 At the June meeting a Board member moved to rescind the 
May approval, but was ruled out of order by the Chair. The 
matter was put over to the September LPL meeting  
In what was apparently a response to the concerns raised by 
members of the public, the LPL posted an explanation of the 
program and a notice of an upcoming public forum on their 
website 
 
Internet Policy Project Plan 
 
 
The LPL webpage included the following statement, the gist of 
which had been repeated on a number of occasions: 
 
This project is not about restricting intellectual 
freedom. It is about reducing the risk of unintentional 
exposure of customers to images, on computer screens 
in the library, that are not appropriate in a public space, 
specifically images that are violent or sexually explicit in 
nature, without compromising access to information such 
as consumer health or sexual education resources. It is 
very important to the Library that we provide a welcoming 
space and positive experience for our customers, while 
ensuring they have access to the information they need.  
 
What was the evidence to 
support the decision to filter? 
 
 
The ensuing debate focused on restricting intellectual freedom.  
 
Content filters had been placed on public terminals in the adult 
sections of the library. The opponents to filtering argued that 
intellectual freedom was certainly being constrained and that it 
was disingenuous to suggest otherwise.  
 
The real question was whether or not the “restrictions” (or 
“protections” depending on your viewpoint) were reasonable 
and warranted based on the situation. 
 
What was the evidence upon which the decision to filter was 
based? 
 
So goes the logic of those who would liquidate intellectual freedom 
and replace it with questions of customer service.  
What was the evidence to 
support the decision to filter? 
 
 
The Staff Report circulated at the May 2007 
meeting was short on specifics in terms of why 
filtering was needed: 
 
 




As we see from a review of the Canadian case-law, courts have been 
more open and realistic when grappling with these difficult issues.  
 
When faced with restrictions on expression in cases involving obscenity, 
hate-speech and even child pornography, the courts begin by even 
these forms of expression are protected under section 2b of the 
Charter. They then proceed with the analysis of whether such 
restrictions can are justified by reasonable measures “prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.” In other words, it might be excusable to limit intellectual 
freedom (expression rights in the words of the charter).  But only if 
certain conditions are met. 
 
The question should not be framed in terms of satisfying the 
most customers.  The question was how to engage in a serious 
balancing of conflicting values.  
 
Very different questions ... Perhaps with very different results 
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The Netsweeper  
Classification 
System 
LPL initially said it was 
going to block: 
 






(the blocking of 9-extreme was 
subsequently discontinued) 
The Netsweeper  
Classification System 
The Netsweeper  
Classification System 
Note: Categories 9 and 23 contain what we will later call  
“Non-Butler material” 
Internet Filtering in the Library 
• The question of whether to filter internet 
terminals in public libraries has been a 
controversial issue since internet services 
were first introduced in the 1990’s 
• In the United States, the controversies 
have included numerous attempts to 
mandate filtering through legislation and 
several court cases 
• There has been less controversy in Canada, 
and there is no published legal case on the 
subject 
Internet Filtering in the Library 
• Internet filtering has generally been disfavored by the library 
community and its associations on the grounds on intellectual 
freedom and access to information grounds 
• The ALA has opposed mandatory internet filtering and has 
gone to court on several occasions to stop it 
• See ALA 2001 resolution opposing the enactment of the 
Children's’ Internet Protection Act by the 106th Congress, 
calling on the 107th Congress to repeal it, and vowing to 
challenge the act in court if necessary 
• In many communities, the pressures for internet filtering come 
from various sources but are typically met with opposition 
from the library boards 
• In the U.S., after unsuccessful attempts to mandate internet 
filtering failed to pass muster under the First Amendment, 
Congress passed the  
• There has been less controversy in Canada, and there is no 
published legal case on the subject 
Statement on Library Use of Filtering Software 
ALA Intellectual Freedom Committee 
 
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court in Reno, 
Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, et al., issued a sweeping reaffirmation 
of core First Amendment principles and held that 
communications over the Internet deserve the highest level 
of Constitutional protection. 
 
The Court’s most fundamental holding was that 
communications on the Internet deserve the same level of 
Constitutional protection as books, magazines, newspapers, 
and speakers on a street corner soapbox. The Court found 
that the Internet “constitutes a vast platform from which to 
address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of 
readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers,” and that “any 
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a 
voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox.” 
ALA Resolution on the Use of Filtering 
Software in Libraries (1997) 
WHEREAS, On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme 
Court issued a sweeping re-affirmation of core First 
Amendment principles and held that communications 
over the Internet deserve the highest level of 
Constitutional protection; and  
 
* * *  
 
RESOLVED, That the American Library Association affirms 
that the use of filtering software by libraries to block 
access to constitutionally protected speech violates 
the Library Bill of Rights.  
ALA Council, July 1997 
CIPA 
• Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) enacted 
in 2000 forbidding libraries from receiving e-rate 
or LSTA funding unless filtering software is used 
 
• 2001 ALA resolution called on Congress to repeal 
CIPA or ALA would litigate it 
 
• Trial ct ruled CIPA unconstitutional in ALA v US 
 
• USSC plurality opinion, 4 of the 9 justices 
(Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia & Thomas) upheld 
CIPA as within the Congress’ broad “spending 
power” 
CIPA upheld in US v ALA 
• Plurality finds internet filtering not a first 
amendment violation constitutional violation 
• Kennedy & Bryer filed separate concurring 
opinions on different grounds 
• Stevens, Souter & Ginsberg dissented 
• Question of “as-applied” challenge left open 
• Many libraries in US have complied in order 




No similar mandate in Canada 
• In fact there is no instance of a 
published decision on internet filtering 
in Canada.  It is an open and untested 
question. 
• Research Question: How would the 
Canadian Courts respond to a 
challenge to internet filtering in a 
public library brought under the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 
Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms Analysis 
Section  1.  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  
 
Section 2.  
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:  
 
b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication;  
Charter Analysis: General  
There have been numerous cases finding an infringement of 
section 2(b) where the measure was upheld as a 
reasonable measure under section 1. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a two-step test to 
decide if an individual’s freedom of expression has been 
infringed.   
 
• first : determine whether the activity falls within freedom 
of expression (is expressive activity involved)   
• second: determine whether the purpose or the effect of the 
impugned government action is to restrict that freedom  
 
If there is an infringement of freedom of expression, the 
inquiry then turns to whether it can be justified under 
section 1.  
Charter Analysis: General  
• Courts would likely find internet filtering by a 
public agency an infringement of expressive 
activity (including the right to receive 
information which is read into section 2b)  
• The more difficult question would be whether 
it is justifiable under section 1. 
• Courts have found infringements of 
expression rights in cases involving hate 
speech, obscenity and even child 
pornography.   
• But such measures were found to be 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.  
How would a filtering challenge 
be decided under section 1? 
• Assuming the court finds the charter applicable 
(a public library is a creature of provincial 
legislation and its board is appointed by the 
municipal council). . . 
• And assuming an infringement of expressive 
activity is found (which is exactly what filters 
are designed to accomplish) 
• Then the analysis would turn to section 1. Is 
the measure a reasonable limit prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society?  
How would a filtering challenge 
be decided under section 1? 
• In a series of cases, the courts 
have developed several tests to 
determine if the section 1 
standard has been met.  
• The four part analysis of the what 
constitutes a reasonable limit in a 
democratic society is known as 
the Oakes test is applied. . . 
Oakes test 
The test for “reasonable limits” was established in R. v. 
Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 (S.C.C.), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 
 
First: Look at the importance of the objective of the limiting 
measure. The objective underlying the limitation must 
be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom 
 
Second: The means chosen to reach this objective are must 
be proportionate.  What is the reasonableness of the 
means adopted to achieve the objective (there are three 
components to this second question, hence four parts to 
the Oakes test)  
 
The onus is on the government to establish the 
elements of justification under section 1 
Oakes: Legitimate Objective 
• Objective must be sufficiently important to justify overriding 
a protected right 
 
• Objective must relate to concerns which are pressing & 
substantial in a free and democratic society 
 
• Courts have been deferential to legislative judgments 
 
• How the this legislative purpose / objective is defined will be 
important in later analysis. If the objective is narrowly 
stated, it may be easier to justify the limitations as 
proportionate in later analysis (or if stated too broadly, 
proportionality may be harder to justify) 
Oakes: Legitimate Objective 
• The Oakes case dealt with the constitutionality of a 
reverse onus presumption that required the accused 
found in possession of drugs to show that they lacked the 
intent to traffic in the drugs 
 
• As to the first prong of the test, the court found that there 
was a legitimate governmental objective in curbing traffic 
in drugs.   
 
• In other cases, courts have found legitimate objectives in 
curbing hate speech and the harms caused by 
pornography.  
 
• A court would likely find that internet filtering meets this 
requirement. 
Oakes: Proportionality 
It’s not enough for there to be a legitimate objective for the 
limitation -- limitation must be proportionate to the objective 
-- three strands to this inquiry: 
1. rational connection between the objective and the limitation 
- it  cannot be arbitrary or capricious (no shifting purpose)  
2. Minimal Impairment test: Would there be other reasonable 
way to satisfy the objective that would have less impact on 
the right being considered? While Oakes spoke of “least 
restrictive means” later cases relax the standard so the 
measure chosen needn’t absolutely be least restrictive 
alternative. The government should show why a less 
restrictive alternative would be inadequate. 
3. Overall balance/proportionality between objective and the 
means used 
Some applications of the Oakes test 
 
• Compelling the observance of Christian 
Sabbath not a compelling objective (R. v Big M 
Drug Mart) 
• Requiring recital of Lord’s Prayer in public 
schools not a permissive objective (Zylberberg 
v Sudbury Bd of Educ) 
• Province denying protection of its Human 
Rights laws to gays/lesbians lacked proper 
objective (Vriend v Alberta) 
• Rational connection (and legitimate objective) 
exists for curbing cigarette ads (RJR v Canada) 
Some applications of the Oakes test 
 
• Limiting obscenity (based on harm- not morals) 
legitimate interest (R. v Butler) 
• Limiting harm caused by hate-speech legitimate interest 
(R. v Keegstra) 
• Banning publication of opinion polls within three days of 
election not based on legitimate interest -- objective of 
giving voters a period of poll-free rest and reflection 
rejected (Thomson Newspapers v Canada) 
• Province denying protection of its Human Rights laws to 
gays/lesbians lacked proper objective (Vriend v Alberta) 
• Rational connection (and legitimate objective) exists for 
curbing cigarette ads (RJR v Canada) 
Limitations on Pornography 
& Hate-Speech 
• Pornography (and hate-speech) qualify as 
protected expressive activities as they convey a 
message 
• Provisions criminalizing certain forms of 
pornography (obscenity and child pornography) 
and certain hate speech are considered 
infringements of expression, but are upheld as 
reasonable section 1 limitations 
• Crucial analysis in these cases is under sec. 1. 
Obscenity: Criminal Code Sec. 163 
(1) Every one commits an offence who 
 
(a)makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or has in his 
possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or circulation 
any obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or 
other thing whatever; or 
(b)makes, prints, publishes, distributes, sells or has in his possession for 
the purpose of publication, distribution or circulation a crime comic. 
 
(2) Every one commits an offence who knowingly, without lawful 
justification or excuse, 
 
(a) sells, exposes to public view or has in his possession for such a 
purpose any obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph 
record or other thing whatever; 
(b)publicly exhibits a disgusting object or an indecent show; 
(c)offers to sell, advertises or publishes an advertisement of, or has for 
sale or disposal, any means, instructions, medicine, drug or article 
intended or represented as a method of causing abortion or 
miscarriage; or 
(d)advertises or publishes an advertisement of any means, instructions, 
medicine, drug or article intended or represented as a method for 
restoring sexual virility or curing venereal diseases or diseases of 
the generative organs. 
But What is obscenity?  
Is it narrower than pornography? 
 Obscenity is defined in section 163(8) of the Criminal 
Code: 
 
(8) For the purposes of this Act, any 
publication a dominant characteristic 
of which is the undue exploitation of 
sex, or of sex and any one or more of 
the following subjects, namely, crime, 
horror, cruelty and violence, shall be 
deemed to be obscene.  
• Note how this definition is much narrower and specific than 
merely being sexually explicit.  
• Not all pornography is obscene. 
• This definition of obscenity was upheld in  R. v Butler (1992) 
R. v Butler (1992) 
• Butler (a sex shop operator) was convicted of selling and 
possessing obscene material under section 163 of the 
Criminal Code. 
• The court unanimously agreed that the prohibition of 
obscenity was an infringement of the right to expression 
under section 2(b) 
• The majority went on to find the provision justified under 
section 1. The definition of obscenity was limited– it did 
not apply to ALL materials that were sexually explicit 
• The specific forms of exploitation of sex (must be undue or 
combined with or of sex and any one or more of the 
following crime, horror, cruelty and violence) were deemed 
harmful to society 
R. v Butler (1992): Upholds sec. 163 
• The specific forms of exploitation of sex (must be 
undue or combined with or of sex and any one or 
more of the following crime, horror, cruelty and 
violence) were deemed harmful to society 
• Harm was not based on offense to morals (as 
under previous decency laws) but based on harm 
to society, particularly to women. 
• Law was drafted with enough specificity so that 
it was not excessively vague.  
• Legitimate objective requirement was met – 
avoidance of harm to society (not merely a 
moral statement) 
R. v Butler (1992): Upholds sec. 163 
• Sufficiently important objective (as in limitation 
upheld re hate-speech in Keegstra in 1992) 
Legitimate objective requirement was met – 
avoidance of harm to society (not just on moral 
grounds) 
• Restriction satisfies proportionality requirements 
as it does not extend beyond material that creates 
appreciable risk to society 
• Provision does not extend to serious artistic 
expression nor to private possession of obscene 
materials (note that in the case of child 
pornography, possession itself is also prohibited 
and this was upheld in R. v Sharpe in 2001) 
Libraries may limit “Butler” materials, and 
should undertake due diligence to do so 
• Materials that fit the definition of obscenity as 
upheld and interpreted in the Butler decision are 
referred to as “Butler materials 
• There would be no issue with a library blocking 
content if it were limited to “Butler materials” 
• In fact, libraries should exercise diligence in 
protecting the public from exposure to Butler 
materials on its premises.  
• The question becomes how to do that without at 
the same time limiting access to non-Butler 
materials 
Some important Post-Butler cases 
• R v Sharpe (S.C.C. 2001) 
 
• Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v 
Canada (S.C.C. 2000) 
 
• R v Glad Day Bookshops (2004, Ont SCJ) 
R v Sharpe (S.C.C. 2001) 
 
• accused charged with two counts of possession of child 
pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and two 
counts of possession of child pornography for the purposes of 
distribution or sale under s. 163.1(3).  
• Crown concedes infringement of section 2b rights, but argued that 
the justification under s. 1  
• Both the trial judge and the maj of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal ruled that the prohibition of the simple possession of child 
pornography as defined under s. 163.1 of the Code not justifiable. 
• SCC allowed appeal should be allowed and the charges remitted 
for trial. 
• Court read in two peripheral exclusions relating to expressive 
material privately created and kept by the accused-but otherwise 
upheld provision 
Little Sisters Book and  
Art Emporium v Canada (2000) 
• Customs Tariff Act prohibits importation of 
obscene materials into Canada and authorizes 
• G-L Bookstore challenged provisions of Act as well 
as discriminatory treatment of G-L materials. 
• Claim that the Butler test (which uses a single 
community standard) is discriminatory was 
rejected 
• While the majority (6-3) rejected claim that the 
Butler test is unconstitutional in its treatment of 
G-L erotica, the court agreed that the 
administrative failures in applying the act were 
sufficient to grant relief and additional guidelines 
were established (dispute iss ongoing) 
Little Sisters Book and  
Art Emporium v Canada (2000) 
• More info about the ongoing controversy is at their website 
http://www.littlesistersbookstore.com 
 
• Site was originally classified by Netsweeper as (23) 
pornography so would have been blocked at LPL) 
 
• The 23 rating applied to text-only pages in the case archive 
as well as some of the more picturesque product descriptions 




This website has since been reclassified 
R v Glad Day Bookshops (2004) 
• Act required submission of films to review board prior to 
exhibiting or distributing. D. shows film without submitting 
for review. Conviction at trial court 
• Superior Court on appeal found the statutory scheme violates 
section 2(b) and is not justified by section 1. Provisions of Act 
stricken--Theatre Act continues to apply to classification 
(which was not in issue) 
• First strand of Oakes test satisfied - there is a legitimate 
government objective -- to reduce harm to society associated 
with the dissemination of pornography (like Butler) 
• Second strand satisfied too (rational connection between 
challenged provision and legitimate objective- also relying on 
Butler) 
• But third (no more impairment than necessary and fourth 




R v Glad Day Bookshops (2004) 
• The detailed analysis provided under the third 
prong is particularly relevant to the filtering 
issue 
• Court characterizes measure as a prior 
restraint (which are viewed with disfavour as 
particularly strong restraints on speech as 
contrasted with less onerous provisions for 
subsequent prosecutions) 
• Court analyzes four separate flaws of a 
system of prior restraint: 
Glad Day Court analyzed four separate flaws  
of a system of prior restraint 
1) breadth of potential censorship  
•  very broad as to films to which it applies (all films),  
•  range of subject matter in its ambit (more than just Butler 
materials) 
•  and viewers it affects (all viewers, not just children) 
2) delay in publication of time sensitive material (not a problem) 
 
3) lack of transparency 
• while the regulations are available to the public, the Board also 
used confidential internal guidelines that were not.  
• public would not know if a film was ordered cut in part 
• nor does Board prepare an annual report listing what was censored 
4) propensity to favour censorship over speech 
• even at just a 3% censorship rate (550 films over last five years) it 
is still exercise of censorship is not infrequent. To properly analyze 
this evidence, court would have to look at cut segments to see how 
discretion was exercised and this was not provided 
Court’s analysis leads to rejection of 3rd prong 
• Court holds government failed to uphold its onus of showing 
that the adopted measures impair the Charter no more than 
necessary 
• while no appreciable delays in distribution, the transparency 
could be improved but the biggest problem for the court was 
the wide breadth of the potential censorship 
• government failed to provide any evidence of potential harm 
that could result to groups or to society from non-Butler 
materials. Government could have produced more evidence on 
this but they did not 
• while it was evident to the court that the materials were not 
suitable to children, the statutory scheme did not distinguish 
between children and adults 
• government failed to show why a less intrusive means would 
not have satisfied its objective 
• while not necessary to do so, court also says fourth prong not 
satisfied 
Some tentative conclusions 
 The Glad Day case seems particularly adaptable to the 
filtering issue 
 A court would likely find a violation of section 2b, and 
would also likely find a legitimate government 
objective that is based on the prevention of harm 
 Whether the other strands of the Oakes test could be 
met are more problematic 
 Particular problems in justifying this analysis could 
include the failure of the library to articulate an 
objective in any but the most general of terms. While 
the general articulation of the objective might satisfy 
the first strand of the analysis, it will make compliance 
with the other tests more difficult. 
Some tentative conclusions 
 It is not at all clear that there is even an appreciable 
measure that is “prescribed by law” in this case 
 Even if a court were to overlook that flaw in the initial 
stage of the analysis, it would present a problem in 
the later stages of the Oakes analysis 
 Other problems will include: 
 The lack of transparency in terms of how sites are 
selected for blocking, and what sites  have been blocked 
is particularly problematic 
 the apparent inclusion of non-Butler materials in terms 
of what is being blocked 
 The failure to exhaust less restrictive alternatives such 
as furniture arrangement or limiting filtering to the 
children's’ rooms 
Some tentative conclusions 
Treating the issue of internet filtering in LPL under the 
assumptions of the “customer service” paradigm (which 
includes an appeal to local moral standards, weighing 
responses in terms of customer satisfaction, vague and 
shifting objectives, and the denial that there is even an 
issue of intellectual freedom) will not help establish the 
necessary justifications under section, the onus of which is 
always on the government. 
The imposition of filtering software by the London 
Public Library in the adult sections of the library and 
throughout the wireless network created a system 
of prior restraint and censorship of internet content 
that infringes section 2b of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and may not be justifiable 
under section 1 
LPL Board reverses filtering decision in 2008-  
with ongoing annual review 
• LPL Board finally persuaded to seek independent legal counsel 
after receiving June 2008 letter from CIPPIC 
 
“We have become aware of the London Public Library’s . . . project to filter internet  
content in its public-access internet terminals.  We write out of concern that, in 
its zeal to provide  a safe environment for library patrons, the Board has 
imposed an impermissibly restrictive  approach to the filtering of the internet 
that violates the Canadian Constitution’s protection of  freedom of expression 
as enshrined in s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”  
  
• Policy reversed later in 2008 after receiving Lerner’s opinion 
(not released) but summary suggests agreement with CIPPIC 
• New policy calls for annual review of LPL internet policies 
• Now on LPL agendas for October and November 2011 





tested again on October  4, 2011 at 
http://www.netsweeper.com/index.php?page=netsw_test_a_site&keep_has_js=1) 
with same result. 
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